Research

Dissertation

“Misengaged, Not Disengaged: How Campaigns Reach Latino Voters with Economic Messaging”

Given partisan polarization on immigration, Latino voters have been assumed to trend Democratic in their overall vote choice. However, between a quarter and a third of Latino voters consistently support Republicans — including those who use inflammatory rhetoric about immigrants. Latino independents, meanwhile, remain one of the lowest-participating groups in American elections. The continued non-partisan status of Latino independents suggests that further immigration messaging is unlikely to persuade them. Issue polls consistently show that economic concerns (jobs, taxes, inflation) and social-service spending (healthcare, education) are most important to Latinos overall. In my dissertation I explore the potential for these economic and social-service messages to persuade and engage Latino voters.

I argue that campaign rhetoric on economics and social services could appeal to Latinos because they have been relatively underexposed to such messaging. Using television ads collected by CMAG/Kantar Media (via the Wisconsin Advertising Project and the Wesleyan Media Project), I find that Democratic campaigns tend to emphasize immigration in their Spanish-language ads while neglecting economic and social-service topics. Republican Spanish-language ads cover a wider topical range — including economics, social services, and even pro-immigrant stances. While Democrats retain a roughly 5-to-1 Spanish-language ad-volume advantage, Republicans use a wider topical range.

Publications

“It’s the Economy: The Effect of Economic Policy Appeals on Latino Independents”

Political Behavior (2025). rdcu.be/d7JV7

Three online survey experiments with large samples of Latino Democrats, Republicans, and independents. Respondents were exposed to economic and immigration messages from either party. Latino partisans aligned with their parties’ views — including on immigration. For out-party and independent evaluations, however, undocumented-immigration messaging was more polarizing than persuasive. Economic messaging produced more positive persuasive effects, especially among independents. Latino partisans align with their parties; Latino independents likely remain amenable to economic messages from either side.

“Partisan Change with Generational Turnover: Latino Party Identification from 1989 to 2023”

Journal of Race and Ethnic Politics (2025). doi.org/10.1017/rep.2025.31

Co-authored. We examine Latino party identification over 34 years using 35 national surveys (n > 103,000) plus Census-based post-stratified weights. From 2000–2012, a slight overall increase in Democratic identification was driven by foreign-born Latinos. After 2012: declining Democratic identification overall, greater Republican identification among foreign-born and older native-born Latinos, and accelerating Independent identification among native-born Millennial and Gen Z Latinos. Generational turnover and differences by nativity challenge prevailing theories of Latino partisan change over time.

Working Papers

“Bringing Retrospective Voting Back In: Economic Voting and Latino Electoral Volatility”

With Tyler Reny, Joshua Dyck, and Bagel Johnson

Recent Latino electoral behavior has swung significantly — from more GOP support under Bush, to large Democratic margins under Obama, to renewed Republican support under Trump. Theories of group-identity or ideological alignment struggle to explain these patterns. We argue that retrospective economic voting is an under-appreciated driver of this volatility. Given that Latinos have lower SES and weaker partisanship, they are more likely to exhibit economic responsiveness compared to other racial and ethnic groups. We test this argument using three complementary empirical strategies. Compared to White and Black Americans: (1) Latino macropartisanship more closely tracks economic conditions; (2) Latino economic perceptions are more correlated with vote switching toward or away from incumbents; and (3) Latinos are more likely to reward or punish incumbents following changes in local unemployment. We conclude with implications for campaigns, scholars, and American politics.

“Who’s Targeting Latinos? How Democrats and Republicans Use Latino Identity Cues in Televised Campaign Ads from 2000–2016”

With Ali Valenzuela and Chris Flores

Co-designed coding scheme to identify Latino identity cues in CMAG TV ad data, 2000–2016. In areas with more Latinos, both parties have over time increased their use of symbolic cues (Spanish messaging, Latino characters). On immigration the parties have diverged: Democrats use pro-immigrant Spanish-language messaging in majority-Latino areas; Republicans use anti-immigrant English-language messaging in low-Latino areas. Both parties are likely to keep pursuing Latino votes through non-immigration identity cues, even as they polarize on immigration itself.

“Pa’lante: How the Young Lords Articulated a Radical Latino Political Consciousness”

The Young Lords were a radical Puerto Rican group active in New York and Chicago in the 1960s and ’70s. By articulating an anti-establishment Latino political consciousness, they often conflicted with other panethnic groups seeking recognition from the U.S. government, businesses, and media. I examine how they tied community-based engagement and self-sufficiency to progressive politics on race, gender, sexuality, and class. I argue their organizational success came from explicitly emphasizing radical ideology while addressing more immediate community concerns — economic opportunity, education, healthcare. Though the organization fell to factionalism, it offers an alternative conception of Latino panethnicity that diverges from the incorporation-oriented identity that eventually became dominant.