

Who's Talking about Latinos? How Democrats and Republicans Target Latinos in Televised Campaign Advertising from 2000 to 2016

Ali A. Valenzuela* Derek Wakefield† Chris Flores‡

August 21, 2024

Abstract

Campaigns seeking to engage Latino voters frequently use television ads that reference one or more aspects of Latino identity. These include Spanish-language advertising, pro-immigrant rhetoric, descriptive representation of Latinos, and explicit (pan)ethnic cues. Additionally, Latinos are also often the target of anti-immigrant rhetoric. For elections more recent than 2004, however, research on these types of ads remains limited. To address this gap, we content-analyzed all available CMAG ads aired in House, Senate, and Presidential races in the United States for Latino identity references. Our results show modest change from 2000-2012, when both parties engaged in targeted but low-volume deployments of mostly symbolic appeals. In 2016, however, polarized immigration stances dominated with Republicans airing many more ads in English with anti-immigrant rhetoric, and Democrats airing Spanish ads with pro-immigrant rhetoric. Both parties also aired many more ads with Latino characters in 2016. We further find that both parties target symbolic identity content towards Latino voters but diverge on immigration: Democrats emphasize inclusionary stances towards Latinos, while Republicans emphasize exclusionary stances in general. We conclude by discussing implications for research on campaign messaging and Latino voter engagement.

Keywords: Latino Politics, Television Ads, Campaigns, Communication, Ethnic Targeting, REP, Identity, Immigration

*Associate Professor, Department of Government, American University; alival@american.edu

†Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science, Emory University

‡PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Stanford University

1 Introduction

In recent years, U.S. citizens of Hispanic or Latino origin have significantly increased their share of the total U.S. population (Krogstad 2020), and in the process significantly increased the political salience and weight of Latino voters in U.S. presidential and Congressional elections (Barreto, Merolla, and DeFrancesco Soto 2011; Garcia 2016; Garza and Yang 2020). In response, well-funded candidates for president and the U.S. Congress, numerous grassroots organizations, and other third-party interests with stakes in the outcome of federal elections have sought to persuade and mobilize Latino voters with varying degrees of success (Mora 2014; Francis-Fallon 2019). While some of these strategies use personal outreach techniques that date back to the 1960s and 70s (Abrajano 2010; Barreto, Merolla, and DeFrancesco Soto 2011), research also indicates that campaigns from both parties increasingly use television ads to reach Latinos (Subervi-Velez 2009; Abrajano 2010; Nteta and Schaffner 2013).

Campaign appeals towards Latinos often reference different aspects of Latino pan-ethnic identity, such as Spanish language, Latin American ancestry, and the immigration experience (Oboler 1995; Barreto 2010). Supporting inclusionary (i.e., positive) policies towards immigrants is a strategy that numerous presidential candidates from both parties—including Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama—have historically used to successfully court Latino voters (Mora 2014; Barreto and Collingwood 2015). However, in the contemporary political climate and especially since Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, the issue of immigration has become intensely polarized along partisan lines such that essentially all Republicans support exclusionary (i.e., anti-immigrant) policies while all Democrats support more inclusionary (i.e., pro-immigrant) policies (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019; Valenzuela and Reny 2021).

Relatedly, a consequence of the growing Latino population in the U.S. is the potential for candidates to activate racial threat among Whites through negative messages about Latinos and immigrants (Mendelberg 2001; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Hopkins

2010; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019). The Republican Party's strategy on this issue, highlighted by former president Trump's 2016 campaign, involves the usage of both implicitly threatening images of Latino immigrants and explicit negative messages about Latinos, immigrants, and Latino national origin subgroups like Mexicans (Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019). By causing Whites to feel competition and threat towards Latino immigrants (Newman, Shah, and Collingwood 2018), and associating that threat with the Democratic Party, such messages can generate significant White opposition to Democratic candidates (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019; Ostfeld 2019). Possibly fearing this White backlash, Democratic outreach to Latinos is often half-hearted even as Democratic interests regularly tout the importance of the Latino vote (Rocha 2020; Sanchez 2021). Research finds televised campaign advertising to Latinos and other communities of color contains more symbolic than substantive content (Abrajano 2010; Nteta and Schaffner 2013; Zárata 2023), potentially contributing to deficits in political information and engagement among Latinos (Velez and Newman 2019). This approach, however, may be a strategic choice by mainstream Democrats to engage Latino voters while minimizing the chance of Whites associating Latinos with the Democratic Party, which reduces Democratic support among White voters overall and even White Democrats (Frymer and Skrentny 1998; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ostfeld 2019).

Yet despite these massive changes in the size and influence of the Latino population and deepening partisan polarization in general and especially on issues of race and immigration, we know precious little about recent patterns in televised political advertisements because existing research is limited to ads from 2004 or earlier (Subervi-Velez 2009; Abrajano 2010; Nteta and Schaffner 2013). This leaves crucial questions unanswered regarding the types of partisan political messaging that Latino (and other) voters were exposed to on television. From 2000 to 2016, how have partisan campaigns shifted their television ad strategies in response to growing Latino political influence, the polarization of immi-

gration, and the ensuing white backlash? How do ads mentioning the polarized issue of immigration differ from those with less polarized Latino identity cues such as Spanish-language messaging and Latino descriptive representation? How have Democratic and Republican campaigns differed over time? And finally, to what extent are these strategies related to Latino population change over time, especially at the state level?

We develop a theory of “multiple audiences” to explain why campaigns strategically target their televised campaign advertisements based on the ethnic makeup of the ad’s likely viewership. While campaigns from both parties see the growing Latino population as a potential source of electoral support, they also fear that Latino outreach might spark backlash from White voters (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). We first hypothesize that both Democratic and Republican campaigns, seeking support from Latino voters, will air a greater number of non-immigration Latino identity cues towards audiences with more Latinos. We label these as “symbolic” appeals because they do not have an explicit policy. These symbolic Latino identity cues include whether the ad has a Latino character, if the sponsoring candidate is Latino, or if an ethnic identity is explicitly mentioned. However, on immigration, we hypothesize that the parties will diverge significantly in terms of their rhetoric on television regarding immigration over the time period that we examine (2000-2016) due to intensifying partisan polarization on the topic. While we predict that Democrats will attempt to emphasize inclusionary/pro-immigrant stances towards audiences with more Latinos, they will try to avoid such topics in ads towards audiences with more Whites. Conversely, while we predict that Republicans will be more likely to use exclusionary rhetoric on immigration towards audiences that have more Whites, they will avoid such topics when the viewership has more Latinos.

To test these claims, we analyzed all available Kantar/Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) television advertising aired in U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and U.S. Presidential races that took place during presidential election years spanning 2000 to 2016 (Fowler, Ridout, and Franz 2016; Franz 2018; Fowler, Franz, et al. 2021). We used existing codes indicating

if the ad was mostly Spanish-language and if immigration was mentioned. We additionally worked with research assistants to provide more detail about Latino identity cues. We coded for whether an ad mentioning the topic of immigration was inclusionary (positive) or exclusionary (negative) in tone. We also coded for the presence of Latino characters and candidates and for the usage of explicit pan-ethnic and national origin identity cues. We then merged data on Latino/White demographics and political competitiveness to assess their effects on campaign messaging strategies.

We show that while both parties deployed a modest amount of Latino identity content from 2000-2012, with Republicans higher in the 2000-2004 period and Democrats increasing more from 2008-2012, such content skyrocketed in 2016. Republican candidates in 2016 aired high volumes of exclusionary immigration rhetoric in English, while Democrats aired a modest but relatively lower amount of inclusionary immigration rhetoric in Spanish. Crucially for our questions about potential backlash, both parties also avoided mentioning immigration with audiences where their views are dissonant (i.e., Democrats in English, Republicans in Spanish). However, while Democrats targeted their inclusionary immigration messages towards areas with more Latinos, Republican exclusionary airings are uncorrelated with Latino population share. For the other less politically polarized Latino identity cues such as Spanish-language ads and Latino characters/candidates, we find that both parties have expanded such efforts over time and target such messages towards areas with more Latinos. These results indicate that while immigration is deeply polarized and each party seeks to hide their immigration rhetoric from unsympathetic viewers, both parties are still likely to keep seeking Latino support through more symbolic—and thus less polarized—Latino identity cues.

These findings contribute broadly to our understanding of racial and ethnic politics in the U.S., as well as campaigns and elections more generally, because they elucidate the decision-making of partisan political campaigns in a context of growing racial and political polarization. Such decisions have demonstrable consequences for voter attitudes and mass

behavior. We provide clear evidence that Democratic immigration-related outreach (and Republican xenophobia) spiked massively in 2016, both of which can push Latino voters towards the Democratic Party (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Gutierrez et al. 2019). Similarly, as the issue of immigration becomes inextricably linked with Latinos and xenophobic stereotypes, whites subsequently experience heightened levels of anxiety and threat (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Farris and Silber Mohamed 2018; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). Indeed, numerous recent studies show that the growing size of the U.S. Latino population is closely tied to growing White support for the Republican Party and conservative approaches to public policy (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Craig and Richeson 2018; Mutz 2018; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019), especially when candidates and elected officials link these immigration-led demographic changes to false claims about cultural and political threats to the nation (Hopkins 2010; Newman, Shah, and Collingwood 2018). Similarly, Democratic appeals to Latinos run the risk of sparking this anxiety among Whites and reducing their support (Ostfeld 2019). But while immigration is a highly polarized topic sparking divergent strategies from each party, we find that partisan usage of less polarized Latino identity cues is quite similar—as the Latino population grows, both parties increase their usage of Spanish-language ads, Latino characters, and explicit Latino and national origin identity cues. Thus, while the substantive issue of immigration has increasingly become a partisan-polarized issue similar to other racial issues (Tesler 2016; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019), both parties still view symbolic Latino identity cues as a way to gain Latino support.

2 Existing Research on Latino Political Targeting

In response to the rising prominence and increasing political salience of Latinos and their strong social group attachments (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Valenzuela 2022), campaigns seeking to engage Latino voters have often relied

on messaging that draws on one or more dimensions of Latino identity Abrajano 2010; Nteta and Schaffner 2013. These dimensions can include multiple traits such as Spanish-language ability, Latin American ancestry, or personal connections to the U.S. immigrant experience (Padilla 1985; Barreto 2010; Mora 2014; Zárata, Quezada-Llanes, and Armenta 2024). Consequently, Latino outreach strategies by political campaigns often deploy a combination of symbolic appeals rooted in Latino identity (e.g., Spanish-language use, explicit references to Latin American countries-of-origin or the broader pan-ethnic Latino community, and/or in-group [Latino] messengers) and more substantive appeals focusing primarily on group-centric policy concerns such as immigration reform (Abrajano 2010; Nteta and Schaffner 2013; Flores and Coppock 2018; Zárata 2023).

2.1 Symbolic Appeals

Symbolic appeals targeting Latino voters typically demonstrate an attempt by campaigns to affirm their support for Latinos as a group (Dovi 2002). These efforts appeal to Latino voters by positively referencing and perhaps priming their social identity attachments (Tajfel 1982), and also by addressing a history in which Latinos have been politically marginalized (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Barreto 2010; Francis-Fallon 2019; Mora 2014). These symbolic appeals may thus represent a signal of a candidate's willingness to address this marginalization, although there is also the risk that symbolic appeals are seen as merely cheap talk (Anguiano 2016; Zárata 2023; Zárata, Quezada-Llanes, and Armenta 2024). In our research, we focus on three specific types of symbolic appeals: political messaging in Spanish, in-group (Latino) messengers, and explicit identity references.

Spanish-language messaging draws on the Spanish language as a powerful glue binding the Latino community across differences in national origin, migration experiences, and regional dispersion (Barreto 2010; Mora 2014; Barreto, Reny, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2017; Flores and Coppock 2018; Zárata, Quezada-Llanes, and Armenta 2024). Perhaps obviously, Spanish use in the U.S. is driven disproportionately by Latinos, with a large share

of the U.S. Latino community reporting that they are either Spanish-dominant (38%) or bilingual (36%) according to a 2015 Pew report (Tran 2010; Gonzalez-Barrera 2015). Because Spanish-language television audiences are disproportionately Latino (Abrajano 2010; Mora 2014; Wilkinson 2015), campaigns may deploy more targeted Latino identity content on Spanish-language stations while simultaneously worrying less about the potential for backlash from White and other non-Latino voters (Abrajano 2010; Hersh 2015; Ostfeld 2019). This ability to target Latinos by language, we argue, is crucial for campaigns seeking to mobilize and persuade Latino voters because it is significantly easier than targeting by a voter's race or ethnicity (Hersh 2015).

Campaign appeals targeting Latinos may also deploy in-group (Latino) messengers, either as candidates or simply as characters featured in the appeal. Because this form of political targeting entails the noticeable presence of Latino individuals in the outreach, it provides Latino voters with positive portrayals of in-group members, which can have empowering effects on Latino political engagement (Barreto 2010; Sadhwani and Mendez 2018; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Sanchez and Morin 2011). In addition, however, the portrayal of Latinos in political outreach may instead be negative in nature, such as in advertisements demeaning Mexican-origin individuals or undocumented Latino migrants more generally (Wroe 2008; Collingwood and O'Brien 2019; Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2019). These symbolic descriptive representations can shape individual Latino political opinions and voting behaviors. For example, Latino voters faced with the option of supporting an in-group (Latino) candidate over an out-group candidate are indeed more likely to turn out and vote for their fellow in-group member (Barreto 2010). Similarly, exposure to negative in-group portrayals appears to mobilize Latino voters against the candidate or party deploying such portrayals (HoSang 2010; Pérez 2015b; Zepeda-Millán 2017; Gutierrez et al. 2019; White 2016).

Explicit (pan-)ethnic identity references include direct mentions of Latino pan-ethnic or Latin American national origin identities—literally, explicit use of Latino identity terms

such as "Hispanic," "Latino," "Mexico," "Puerto Rico," etc. Historical efforts to cultivate Latino political engagement and Latino pan-ethnic identity often emphasized the labels themselves as important ways to gain political and social recognition (Padilla 1985; Calderón 1992; Mora 2014). For example, to raise awareness about a new Hispanic origin question on the 1980 Census, Spanish-language television stations included informational segments showing images of the question and explaining how more people identifying as Hispanic would result in greater social and political recognition (Mora 2014). Campaigns took note and began using pan-ethnic labels in their Spanish-language political outreach (Subervi-Velez 2009; Francis-Fallon 2019; Cadava 2020). Over successive elections, Latino voters exposed to such messaging express stronger senses of attachment to a pan-ethnic identity, suggesting campaigns can help cultivate Latino political cohesion (Valenzuela 2022). Greater exposure to Latino ethnic cues in a neighborhood is associated with stronger individual Latino ethnic identity, for example (Wilcox-Archuleta 2018).

2.2 Substantive Appeals

Campaigns may also focus on more substantive policy issues in their Latino voter outreach—while this can include a variety of issues, in this paper we focus on immigration because it is both an important Latino identity cue and an important policy issue that White voters care deeply about as well (Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019). Immigration as a policy area and as a lived experience is a crucial aspect of Latino panethnic identity (Lee 2008; Barreto 2010; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Garcia 2016). As such, when candidates support inclusionary immigration policies, e.g., Reagan/amnesty and Obama/Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), they tend to gain Latino electoral support (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Francis-Fallon 2019; Cadava 2020). However, White voters exposed to such rhetoric—including White Democrats—tend to react negatively, so campaigns engaging in Latino outreach try to avoid showing such messaging to Whites (Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Nteta and Schaffner

2013; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ostfeld 2019).

The effect of exclusionary immigration policy and rhetoric is more uneven for Latinos. While many Latinos respond to anti-immigrant threat by counter-mobilizing against the threat (Zepeda-Millán 2017; Gutierrez et al. 2019), those with weaker pan-ethnic ties may be demobilized due to their desire to dissociate from stigmatized out-groups like undocumented immigrants (García Bedolla 2005; Pérez 2015b; Pérez 2015a). And while exclusionary immigration rhetoric is primarily oriented towards gaining support from racially conservative White voters (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019), they can also appeal to some Latinos and especially those who prioritize American and Republican identity (Alamillo 2019; Hickel, Alamillo, et al. 2020; Hickel, Oskooii, and Collingwood 2024).

3 Limitations of Existing Research

Much of the research cited above is helpful for understanding how political campaigns might approach mobilizing voters through messaging about Latinos and immigration. However, in terms of research on how campaigns attempt to reach Latinos on television specifically, existing studies are limited by their timeframe, with the most recent analyses being conducted on data from 2004 or even earlier (Abrajano 2010; Nteta and Schaffner 2013). To our knowledge, there is no similarly systematic analysis of televised campaign outreach to Latino voters in the post-2004 time period despite major shifts in politics overall and immigration/Latino politics specifically. In 2006, for example, Republican support for a harsh anti-immigrant bill targeting undocumented immigrants (HR 4437) sparked one of the largest mass mobilizations of Latinos in American political history (Barreto, Manzano, et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Zepeda-Millán 2017). The exclusionary, nativist wing of the GOP, which coalesced into the Tea Party movement and drove Donald Trump's first campaign for president, is now in full control of the Republican Party

(Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019). On the other side of the aisle, Democratic candidates have become more attuned to how they can maximize Latino voter outreach, such as emphasizing support for inclusionary positions on immigration (Barreto and Collingwood 2015). These shifts in elite strategies correspond with changes in each party's respective coalitions, with Republicans increasingly relying on conservative White voters whereas Democrats appeal more to Latino, Black, and other racial minority voters (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019). Given the massive shifts that have occurred since 2004, an updated analysis of partisan campaign outreach towards (and about) Latino voters is sorely needed.

Another crucial change that occurred before 2004 is the rise of cable television, which replaced a small selection of channels (and thus only a few captive audiences) with thousands of options (Prior 2007). By separating television watchers into multiple, highly segmented, and demographically concentrated audiences, cable television gave campaigns enormous power to target their messages. During the same timeframe, campaigns also became more likely to focus on mobilizing their electoral base as opposed to competing for persuadable voters (Hillygus and Shields 2008; Panagopoulos 2016; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019). While other technologies and strategies like targeted canvassing and social media are important parts of campaign playbooks (Gainous and Wagner 2013; Hersh 2015; Novak, K. C. Johnson, and Pontes 2016; Gervais and Wilson 2019), television ads remain a huge focus in terms of campaign messaging and campaign spending (Fowler, Ridout, and Franz 2016; Franz 2018; Fowler, Franz, et al. 2021). Because campaign ads are a costly investment that entail decisions about what to say and where, we argue that analyzing how campaigns deploy televised advertising can reveal the underlying perceptions and assumptions that campaigns make about which ads will work, and for whom. We then apply this framework to better understand how campaigns have approached topics such as Latino identity and immigration, and how such efforts are then related to ad language and to Latino and White demographic patterns.

4 Theory and Hypotheses

We develop a theory of “multiple audiences” to explain how and why campaigns modify their television advertising strategies based on their perceptions of Latino and White voters and their potential as sources of electoral support. As the Latino population continues to grow, campaigns will have increasingly strong incentives to seek their support (Barreto and Segura 2014). However, the potential risk of White voters encountering positive Latino outreach in televised advertising applies a secondary pressure to campaigns fearful that Latino outreach, especially in the form of inclusionary immigration policy proposals and rhetoric, will spark a backlash that leads to a loss of electoral support among Whites (Nteta and Schaffner 2013; Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Given that White voters remain more influential than Latinos in most elections, the threat of White backlash often forestalls Latino outreach (Frymer and Skrentny 1998; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ostfeld 2019; Jardina 2019; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022).

While targeting specific groups is difficult and risky without accurate (and expensive) identifying data (Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Hersh 2015; Zárate 2023), the proliferation of ideological channels on cable television has given campaigns many more opportunities to segment the electorate and focus on micro-audiences (Prior 2007). This is especially true for Spanish-language television, as new information technologies have facilitated the dispersal of Spanish-language programming across the country (Mora 2014; Wilkinson 2015). We posit that the novel proliferation of television outlets in the post-broadcast era (Prior 2007) provides campaigns with many more opportunities to selectively target their messages to multiple audiences based on expectations of the viewership’s ethno-racial composition.

This is how we believe the multiple audiences of English and Spanish-language television are theoretically relevant for understanding campaign advertising: while audiences for English-language channels resemble the general population, Spanish-language viewing audiences are disproportionately Latino (Abrajano 2010; Mora 2014). Campaigns inter-

ested in reaching Latino voters—and only Latino voters—can run Spanish-language ads and feel secure that few White voters will be incidentally exposed. Advertisements in English can also be targeted based on the relative percentage of White and Latino voters in an area: an English-language channel in a majority-Latino area will still reach a disproportionately Latino audience, while an English-language channel in an area with fewer Latinos will reach more non-Latinos.

We argue that these expectations about where campaigns can potentially win votes with the right message—and where they might lose votes if they use the wrong message—can lead to differential targeting strategies by language and media market population demographics. Campaigns are often attempting to engage voters without full information (Hersh 2015), so the ability to target messages to distinct audiences by language is a boon. The strategies used by campaigns in relation to the multiple audiences of Spanish and English-language television thus reveals their underlying perceptions of which messages should work for which viewers, and which should be more selectively deployed. Based on this discussion, we develop several hypotheses regarding how we expect campaigns to use Latino identity cues and related content in televised campaign advertisements.

Our first hypothesis addresses the general incentive that campaigns of both major parties have to appeal to and seek support from Latino voters in contexts with larger Latino audiences: on Spanish-language channels and in media markets with larger Latino population shares. In these contexts, Latinos represent a key electoral constituency that we expect campaigns to target more extensively using symbolic Latino identity content, including Spanish-language use, descriptive representation in the form of Latino actors and candidates in the ads, and explicit references to the Latino community.

H1: In Spanish-language ads and media markets with relatively more Latinos, both Democratic and Republican campaigns will use more symbolic identity content (i.e., positive appeals *not* related to immigration) than in English-language ads and media markets with fewer Latinos.

However, because of how deeply polarized the issue of immigration has become (Abra-jano and Hajnal 2015; Jardina 2019; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022), we also theorize that immigration-related content in political advertising will be deployed differently by the two major parties depending on their expectations of the viewing audiences. Indeed, because there is a significant threat of backlash from the use of a polarized issue like immigration—either from Latinos exposed to exclusionary immigration rhetoric, or from Whites exposed to inclusionary rhetoric—our multiple audiences theory predicts that Democrats will emphasize inclusionary immigration proposals and rhetoric in Spanish, while limiting these appeals in English, and Republicans will emphasize exclusionary immigration proposals and rhetoric in English, while limiting these appeals Spanish.

H2a: In Spanish-language ads and media markets with relatively more Latinos, Democratic campaigns will use *more inclusionary* immigration content than in English-language ads and media markets with fewer Latinos.

H2b: In English-language ads and media markets with relatively more Whites, Democratic campaigns will use *less inclusionary* immigration content than in Spanish-language ads and media markets with fewer Whites.

H3a: In Spanish-language ads and media markets with relatively more Latinos, Republican campaigns will use *less exclusionary* immigration content than in English-language ads and media markets with fewer Latinos.

H3b: In English-language ads and media markets with relatively more Whites, Republican campaigns will use *more exclusionary* immigration content than in Spanish-language ads and media markets with fewer Whites.

5 Data

We test our expectations using a novel dataset built on CMAG advertising data from presidential election years spanning 2000-2016 and originally compiled and coded for

certain attributes by the Wisconsin Advertising (2000-2008) and Wesleyan Media (2012-2016) Projects (Fowler, Ridout, and Franz 2016; Franz 2018; Fowler, Franz, et al. 2021). In 2000 and 2004, the Wisconsin Advertising Project (WAP) compiled CMAG television advertising data from all stations in the top 75 and top 100 largest media markets, respectively. In 2008, the WAP compiled CMAG advertising data from all stations in all 210 media markets in the U.S. In 2012 and 2016, the Wesleyan Media Project (WMP) compiled CMAG television advertising data from all stations in all 210 media markets in the U.S. For both sets of data, the included ads aired in U.S. Presidential, U.S. Senate, U.S. House, and gubernatorial races. We exclude gubernatorial advertising from our analyses because many of these races take place outside of presidential election years.¹ These data represent the most comprehensive set of televised political advertising available in 2000-2016. The WAP and WMP coded the ads for several attributes that we rely on in our analyses. Of these, the most important for our research include which candidate or political party the ad was run in support of; what issue or issues were mentioned in the ad; the media market in which the ad was run; and whether the ad was aired in English or Spanish.

We additionally employed human coders to identify attributes of the advertisements that were not originally collected by the WAP and WMP. These additional attributes include whether the tone of immigration-related messaging was inclusionary (pro-immigrant) or exclusionary (anti-immigrant); the use of descriptive representation in the advertising (Latino characters and candidates); and the inclusion of explicit identity references (mentions of “Latino,” “Hispanic,” or any Latin American national origin group). Both the WAP and WMP included information about whether the advertisements were aired in Spanish; our coders confirmed this information and additionally coded for any inclusion of Spanish in the (predominantly) English-language advertising. By coding these additional attributes of advertisements aired in media markets across the country in presidential election years spanning 2000-2016, we can assess how the use of specific Latino identity content may

¹Our focus on presidential election years means we would have an inaccurate picture of gubernatorial advertising only in these years.

have changed over time, how it varies by party of the candidate or interest group airing the ad, and whether the language of the advertisement is related to its content.

We focus in particular on televised advertisements that include symbolic Latino identity content and immigration-related policy proposals and political rhetoric. We first examine advertisements based on their inclusion of non-policy identity content—specifically, whether they feature Latino characters, Latino candidates, and explicit references to Latinos or Latin American national origins. We then categorize immigration ads based on whether they reflect an inclusionary or exclusionary view towards immigrants, and we additionally categorize them on whether they are referencing the candidate’s own positions on immigration or whether they are attacking the position of their opponent.

6 The Partisan Targeting of Latinos in Televised Advertising


We begin our results by providing an overview of campaign advertising and how it differs based on language and partisanship across presidential election years from 2000 to 2016. Figure 1 displays the volume² of television ads during this time frame separately for English-language ads and Spanish-language ads,³ with Democratic ads shown in blue and Republican ads shown in red. To address the fact that 2000 and 2004 data come from fewer media markets, we also use dashed lines in subsequent years (2008, 2012, and 2016) to show ad airings restricted to just the 75 media markets available in 2000 and 2004, allowing us to make comparisons across time despite data limitations in the early years of our ads data.

For English-language ads, our results show a steady increase over the observed time

²Descriptive results are very similar when using other dependent variables, such as the cost of the ad.

³Note that the Y-axis scales are different, as there are significantly more English-language than Spanish-language ads

Figure 1: All Ads by Partisanship and Language



Note: This figure shows the number of individual ad airings (in thousands) for each year in our dataset. These graphs use data from all ads in the dataset, including primary and general election ads. English-language ads appear in the top graphs and Spanish-language ads are in the bottom ones. Democratic ads are shown in blue and Republican ads are shown in red. Lastly, the 2000 and 2004 CMAG data were limited in the number of media markets that they included (75/100 vs 210), so the dotted lines show results restricted to just the 75 media markets recorded in 2000 to make a more direct comparison. This figure was plotted using the ggplot2 package in R.

period.⁴ Both parties have approximately equal but modest English-language ad shares in 2000. While Democrats have English-language ad advantages in 2004, 2008, and 2016, and Republicans aired somewhat more English-language ads in 2012, overall rates between the two parties are fairly similar across presidential election years.

This is not the case for Spanish-language ads. While both parties were at similar levels

⁴It is important to note the differences between the full dataset (solid line) and the restricted data (dashed line). While the full dataset shows a massive increase in ad volume overall, this increase is much less notable when accounting for the data sparsity in earlier years.


in 2000, they diverged afterwards. While Democrats maintained roughly similar levels of Spanish-language ads in 2004 and 2008 as in 2000, they greatly increased their volume of Spanish language advertisements in 2012 and 2016. Conversely, relative to 2000, Republicans actually decreased their Spanish-language ad volume in all subsequent years, although they had slightly more in 2012 and 2016 than in 2004 and 2008. Overall, these results suggest that while English-language ad volumes targeting Latinos have remained fairly steady between both parties, Democrats have relied significantly more on Spanish-language ads since 2012, whereas Republicans have become less likely to air such ads.

In Figure 2, we use results generated using our novel data to display trends in symbolic (i.e., non-policy) Latino identity content in televised political advertising. We find differences over time in how campaigns from the two major parties deploy the use of Latino characters, Latino candidates, and explicit Latino identity references. We separate Latino characters based on whether they are "brief" or "major",⁵ and also differentiate these Latino character ads from ads featuring Latino candidates in order to differentiate between descriptive appeals that are less obvious, and perhaps therefore less effective, and descriptive appeals that reflect a more thorough effort at Latino outreach by prominently featuring Latino characters or candidates in the ad (Zárate 2023; Barreto 2010).

We first examine trends in symbolic identity content for English-language ads. For brief Latino characters, we find that Republican English-language ads contain relatively more such content in 2000 and 2004 compared to Democratic ads in those early years. Both parties had equal rates in 2008, whether looking at all media markets or just the top 75 from 2000/2004, and their use of brief Latino characters dropped off precipitously in 2012. However, in 2016, we observe a massive increase—both among Republican campaigns, but especially among Democratic campaigns. While Democrats aired only 1,418 brief Latino character ads in English in 2012, in 2016 they aired ads including such content more than 165,000 times.

⁵Latino characters who were on screen in political advertisements for more than five seconds and those who had a speaking role were labeled "major" Latino characters. Otherwise, they were labeled "brief."

Figure 2: Symbolic Latino Identity References by Partisanship and Language



Note: This figure shows trends in symbolic Latino identity content in terms of individual ad airings (in thousands). Brief Latino characters are those who were on-screen for less than five seconds and did not have a speaking role; conversely, major Latino characters are either on-screen for longer than five seconds, or have a speaking role. Latino candidates can include ads for the candidate or for when a Latino candidate is advocating for another (non-Latino) candidate. Any ads included immigration policy content are NOT included (see Figure 5). These graphs use data from all other ads in the dataset, including primary and general election ads. English-language ads appear in the top graphs and Spanish-language ads are in the bottom ones. Democratic ads are shown in blue and Republican ads are shown in red. Lastly, the 2000 and 2004 CMAG data were limited in the number of media markets that they included (75/100 vs 210), so the dotted lines shows results restricted to just the 75 media markets recorded in 2000 to make a more direct comparison. This figure was plotted using the ggplot2 package in R.

For major Latino characters in English-language ads, we observe many fewer such ads from either party during the 2000-2012 time period. In 2016, Democrats aired a small number of such ads (14,564) while Republicans extensively used major Latino characters in significantly more English-language ads (79,511).

For Latino candidates, neither party aired large volumes of English-language ads with such content from 2000 through 2012, with only a small increase in Democratic ads in 2004 (14,173). However, as with major Latino characters, we observe a sharp increase in Republican usage of English-language ads with Latino candidates in 2016 (103,881), which is especially notable when compared to a much smaller relative increase for Democratic ads (19,295).

Last, we examine trends in English-language ads that include explicit pan-ethnic or national origin references. Airings of such ads are minimal from 2000 through 2012, with a small uptick among Democrats in 2016 (12,269).


We next examine trends for Latino identity content in Spanish-language ads. For brief Latino characters, we first observe very few ads by either party in 2000. In 2004 and subsequent years, however, Democrats aired more such ads, with a maximum of 10,854 airings in 2012. Republicans slightly increased their volume of ad airings with Latino brief characters to a maximum of 3,791 in 2004, but they also aired consistently fewer brief Latino character ads in Spanish overall than Democrats.

For major Latino characters in Spanish-language ads, we observe low volumes from either party from 2000 to 2008. While Republicans continued to air low volumes with a maximum of only 2,233 in 2016, Democrats greatly increased their use of major Latino characters in Spanish-language ads to a maximum of 27,043 ad airings in 2016.

Next, for Latino candidates, both parties again have low volumes of Spanish-language ads from 2000 through 2008. Both parties then greatly increase their volume in 2012 (5,696 from Democrats, 6,937 from Republicans). In 2016, Democrats slightly increased the volume of such ads (6,764) while they decreased for Republicans (1,630).

Lastly, for explicit ethnic identity references in Spanish-language ads, we find small volumes from Democrats in 2004 (684) and 2012 (739), but otherwise find a minimal volume of such ads.

Figure 3: Explicit Identity References in Ads by Partisanship and Language



Note: This figure shows trends in explicit Latino identity references in terms of individual ad airings (in thousands). Explicit ethnic cues include any direct reference to either panethnic or national origin identities (e.g., Latino, Mexican, Puerto Rico). Any ads included immigration policy content are NOT included (see Figure 5). These graphs use data from all other ads in the dataset, including primary and general election ads. English-language ads appear in the top graphs and Spanish-language ads are in the bottom ones. Democratic ads are shown in blue and Republican ads are shown in red. Lastly, the 2000 and 2004 CMAG data were limited in the number of media markets that they included (75/100 vs 210), so the dotted lines shows results restricted to just the 75 media markets recorded in 2000 to make a more direct comparison. This figure was plotted using the ggplot2 package in R.


Our final set of findings over time examines more closely how campaigns discussed the issue of immigration in their televised campaign advertisements. In Figure 5, we differentiate between ads that reflect an inclusionary, or positive, view towards immigrants and immigration, and those that instead are exclusionary, or negative, towards immigrants.⁶ As with previous figures, we separate ads by language and by partisanship and include dashed lines showing results restricted to the 75 media markets available in the 2000 data. Note that there were no Spanish-language ads that included exclusionary immigration content in our data.

We first address exclusionary immigration rhetoric in English-language ads. The volume of such content is minimal in 2000 and 2004, with a local peak for Republicans (40,619) and a smaller one for Democrats (11,125) in 2008. Republicans decreased such rhetoric in 2012 but massively increased it in 2016 to 182,064 ad airings—more than 10% of the total Republican ad volume in 2016. Meanwhile, Democrats almost entirely avoided exclusionary immigration content after 2008.

Next, we examine inclusionary immigration content in English-language ads. From 2000 through 2012, such content is negligible from either party. We only observe a notable uptick in 2016, with a larger increase among Democrats (19,397) but also one among Republicans (8,344). Still, the volume of Democratic inclusionary immigration messaging in 2016 was significantly less than the volume of Republican exclusionary messaging. Lastly, we analyze inclusionary immigration messaging in Spanish-language ads. Such ads are minimal from Republicans across the time period and from Democrats until 2012, when there is a slight uptick (10,588). There is an even greater increase in 2016 to 42,160 ad airings among Democrats. The overall volume of inclusionary immigration

⁶The original CMAG data includes codes for whether an ad mentions immigration or not. Many of these ads include references to free trade and NAFTA without taking a specific stance on immigration or immigrants. We had RA's double-check these content codes when generating the exclusionary/inclusionary codes. 10,273,092 ad airings lacked any immigration content; 259,487 airings total used exclusionary rhetoric while 85,603 used inclusionary; 75,397 ads originally coded as having immigration content either lacked such content or were not clearly inclusionary or exclusionary; 18,382 airings with immigration content were not originally coded and were re-coded as either inclusionary or exclusionary.

Figure 4: Immigration Ad Tone by Partisanship and Language




Note: This figure shows trends in immigration content in terms of individual ad airings (in thousands). Exclusionary immigration ads (i.e., those expressing an anti-immigrant/anti-immigration stance) are shown on the left; note that these were only found in English-language ads. Inclusionary immigration ads (i.e., those expressing a pro-immigrant/pro-immigration stance) are shown in the middle (English-language ads) and right (Spanish-language ads). These graphs use data from all ads in the dataset, including primary and general election ads. Democratic ads are shown in blue and Republican ads are shown in red. Lastly, the 2000 and 2004 CMAG data were limited in the number of media markets that they included (75/100 vs 210), so the dotted lines shows results restricted to just the 75 media markets recorded in 2000 to make a more direct comparison. This figure was plotted using the ggplot2 package in R.

messaging from Democrats is about twice as high in Spanish-language ads compared to in English-language ads, which is notable given that Democrats aired 25 times more English-language than Spanish-language ads in 2016. Put differently, Democratic ads were almost fifty times more likely to mention inclusionary immigration topics in Spanish versus in English. Even still, this volume is dwarfed by the relatively high proportion of Republican English-language ads discussing exclusionary immigration positions in 2016 (10% or

more).

Figure 5: Immigration Ad Tone by Partisanship and Language



Note: This figure shows trends in immigration content in terms of individual ad airings (in thousands). Exclusionary immigration ads (i.e., those expressing an anti-immigrant/anti-immigration stance) are shown on the left; note that these were only found in English-language ads. Inclusionary immigration ads (i.e., those expressing a pro-immigrant/pro-immigration stance) are shown in the middle (English-language ads) and right (Spanish-language ads). These graphs use data from all ads in the dataset, including primary and general election ads. Democratic ads are shown in blue and Republican ads are shown in red. Lastly, the 2000 and 2004 CMAG data were limited in the number of media markets that they included (75/100 vs 210), so the dotted lines shows results restricted to just the 75 media markets recorded in 2000 to make a more direct comparison. This figure was plotted using the ggplot2 package in R.

Our results for the partisan targeting of Latinos over time provide some initial support for our hypotheses. In our first hypothesis, we posited that both parties have incentives to use symbolic Latino identity content when the Latino population is increasingly pivotal to electoral victory—this is why we predicted such content would be increasing over time as the Latino population grows, and why we expected such content to be more common in Spanish-language versus English-language ads. In general, we find that both parties have increased their Latino descriptive representation in televised advertising, especially in 2016, but they each did so in distinct ways. While Democrats were more likely to deploy brief images of Latinos in English-language ads and major Latino characters in Spanish-language ads, Republicans have instead used more ads that include Latino candidates. Meanwhile, neither party much emphasized explicit identity references. These findings provide initial, if suggestive, support for our first hypothesis, as both parties have increased their use of symbolic Latino identity content over time and in Spanish-language ads.

Our second hypothesis predicted that Democrats will emphasize inclusionary immigration rhetoric in ads directed towards Latinos, while avoiding such topics intended more for White audiences. Conversely, our third hypothesis predicted that Republicans will focus on exclusionary immigration rhetoric in ads directed towards Whites, while avoiding such stances in ads intended for Latinos. Our initial results provide strong support for both of these hypotheses. While Democrats were somewhat likely to mention inclusionary immigration stances in English-language ads in 2016, the number of airings of these ads paled in comparison to the number of Democratic Spanish-language ad airings. This reflects a significant effort to target Latinos with inclusionary messaging while minimizing the exposure of such rhetoric to the general population.

We observe a mirrored dynamic for Republicans and exclusionary immigration rhetoric; Republican ads on immigration tend to emphasize restrictions in English while avoiding the topic entirely in Spanish. Meanwhile, we observe only minimal evidence of Democrats airing ads with any exclusionary rhetoric, and minimal evidence of Republicans airing ads


with any inclusionary immigration rhetoric.

While both parties have become more likely to use symbolic Latino identity content, these results demonstrate that they have polarized significantly in terms of their immigration rhetoric and which groups they believe they can persuade—with Democrats focusing on inclusionary rhetoric towards Latinos, and Republicans emphasizing exclusionary stances towards general population ads.

7 Demographic and Electoral Determinants of Latino-Targeted Advertising

We next extend our analyses to examine how the targeting of ads to specific media markets is affected by local demographic and electoral contexts. These analyses provide a direct test of our hypotheses on how campaigns cater their messaging towards audiences based on the expected number of White and Latino voters who might be affected. An important aspect of campaign outreach on television, and by extension the CMAG data that we utilize, is that ads are purchased and delivered at the level of a media market. A map of these is shown in Figure 6, which shows that many media market units overlap multiple states. However, this provides us with a silver lining for examining how campaigns target Latinos specifically: because of the geographic specificity of media markets, we can analyze targeting efforts with more precision than focusing on state-level data alone. Furthermore, because media markets are the level at which campaigns also make ad purchases, their targeting efforts likely rely on media market-level demographics. This means that the data we use is similar to what campaigns would also have available, providing additional external generalizability to our study.

Figure 6: Map of DMAs



Note: This shows a map of the 212 media markets in the US in 2010 (when the most recent shapefiles are available).

7.1 Additional Data

As with the previous results, our analyses rely primarily on existing CMAG data and our originally coded Latino identity dataset, which provide our outcomes of interest. We then include two other data sources to incorporate demographic and electoral variables. To calculate demographics for each media market, we downloaded American Community Survey (ACS) data,⁷ which includes outcomes for the number of White and Latino voting-eligible people (18+ citizen) at the level of a Census tract, which is quite geographically specific (84,000 tracts across the country). This data is important for two reasons: it includes variables for citizenship (unlike the decennial Census), and is recorded at a geographically specific enough level to make media market-level estimates (unlike with state-level data). Unfortunately, the ACS only began fully releasing this data starting in 2010. We therefore focus on CMAG data from 2008, 2012, and 2016 and link those ads to demographic data from the ACS from 2010, 2012, and 2016. For each media market for each year, we use geospatial analysis software (`sf` in R) to aggregate Census tract data upwards to estimate

⁷This data was accessed from www.data.census.gov

the percentage of the voting-eligible population that is either Latino or White along with overall population estimates.

We also include data on electoral competitiveness from the MIT Election Lab.⁸ We use this data instead of Cook PVI Scores because the latter is no longer publicly accessible. This data includes a record of each presidential election at the state level, with variables showing the total number of votes for each candidate. For our observed time frame (2008 to 2016), there were no major third party nominees, so we compare vote shares between the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates for each state. To begin estimating competitiveness for a given state in a given year, we subtracted the proportion of votes won by the losing party's candidate from the proportion of votes won by the winning candidate. However, this specification means that lower values are the most competitive, which is confusing to interpret. To address this, we reversed the scale so that the "most competitive" elections were now approaching 1, while the "least competitive" were lower on the scale, with a minimum of 0.45.⁹ Once we calculated these state-level estimates, we then again used geospatial analysis packages in R to calculate overlap between each state and media market. We then used this overlap variable to estimate the "average competitiveness" of a given media market based on which states it is overlapping. For example, a media market that is entirely in one state would have competitiveness estimates from just that state, whereas one that is evenly divided between two states would have the average of each state's competitiveness scores.

7.2 Analysis

Our goal is to estimate the relationship between the kinds of topics that campaigns emphasize in their ads—specifically, symbolic Latino identity, inclusionary immigration

⁸See <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/42MVDX>

⁹Specifically, we took the absolute difference between the "competitiveness" estimate (which was approaching 0 for the "most competitive" elections, and had a maximum of 0.55) and 1. This means that values that previously were 0/high competitiveness would now approach 1 on the competitiveness scale, while those with low competition would now be below (e.g., 0.5-0.8).

rhetoric, or exclusionary immigration rhetoric—and local demographic and electoral trends. We use each individual ad airing as the unit of analysis and restrict our scope to just ads from Democrats and Republicans in general elections ($N = 1,277,252$). This avoids potentially aberrant behaviors by unsuccessful primary candidates or third-party candidates. We then use the media market for each ad airing to link in the RA-coded data and demographic/competitiveness data described above. We then estimate binary logistic regression models predicting the probability that any single ad will have a certain topic based on when and where the ad was aired.

We include several predictor variables in our models. "Latino % of VEP" and "White % of VEP" each capture the Latino and White proportion of the given media market's voting-eligible population (18+ citizens). "Spanish Ad" is a binary variable for whether an ad is at least 50% Spanish-language (1) or not (0). "Competitiveness" uses state-level presidential election data to estimate how close the elections are for any given media market, with 1 corresponding to the closest/most competitive elections and lower values indicating less close elections. Media markets that overlap multiple states receive a weighted average of each state's competitiveness variable based on how much they geographically overlap. We also have several control variables addressing the office being competed for in the ad (President and Senate, with House as the omitted baseline), the cost of the ad (in US dollars, and taken as a base-10 logarithm), for the population of the media market (also taken as a base-10 logarithm), and fixed effects for each year (2012 and 2016, with 2008 as the omitted category).¹⁰ We also estimated separate models for Democratic and Republican ads to assess how each party behaves differently when exposed to the same demographic and electoral contexts.

¹⁰We took the base-10 logarithms of the cost and population variables because they each displayed significant exponential increases that also corresponded with ad volume. For example, the maximum values for ad costs and population occur in media markets

7.3 Regression Results

In Table 1, we show several models predicting the probability that a given ad contains symbolic Latino identity content (i.e., Latino characters, candidates, and explicit identity cues) based on various predictor and control variables. The Latino VEP coefficient is positive and significant across models, and the largest coefficient is actually for the Republican-only model. This suggests that campaigns across the board are trying to target Latino voters with symbolic content. The White VEP variable is actually not a consistent negative predictor of symbolic content in the three full sample models. However, for Democrats, we find a negative relationship between White VEP and symbolic ads, suggesting they avoid such portrayals for ads with more White viewership. Meanwhile, for Republican ads, we actually find a positive effect from White VEP on symbolic content. A potential explanation for this are the large number of ads ran by prominent Latino Republicans in 2016, which is supported by the previous descriptive results (see Figure 2) and the year fixed-effects results showing a negative coefficient for 2012 and a positive one for 2016. Still, this result is surprising because it shows that while Democrats appear to be avoiding symbolic content in their ads in areas with more White voters, Republicans are less constrained in their deployment of such descriptive representatives and identity cues. Spanish-language ads are hugely more likely to contain symbolic content, as may be expected, and this coefficient stays consistent across models. Competitiveness is a significantly positive predictor but has a fairly small coefficient. Lastly, while most of the control variables remain consistent or substantively small across models, the office variable shows that presidential ads had the most symbolic content, followed by House ads, while Senate ads consistently had the least symbolic Latino identity content. Meanwhile, the year fixed effects confirm that 2016 was a high point for symbolic identity content both in general and from either party. Overall, these results demonstrate that both parties try to target Latino voters with symbolic identity content—however, while Democrats avoid such content in English-language ads and in areas with more White voters, Republicans appear to

utilize symbolic identity content towards audiences with more Latinos without regard for any potential White viewership.

Table 1: Predictors of Symbolic Content in Ads

<i>Dependent variable: Whether Ad has Symbolic Content (1) or Not (1)</i>					
Latino Representation and Identity References (Excluding All Immigration Ads)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(Dems Only)	(Reps Only)
Latino % of VEP	4.912*** (0.072)	4.021*** (0.077)	3.846*** (0.079)	2.852*** (0.102)	5.283*** (0.132)
White % of VEP	-0.030 (0.064)	0.398*** (0.066)	0.442*** (0.066)	-0.197** (0.082)	1.448*** (0.117)
Spanish Ad		2.767*** (0.021)	2.770*** (0.021)	2.318*** (0.027)	3.644*** (0.037)
Competitiveness			0.287*** (0.017)	0.198*** (0.021)	0.543*** (0.028)
President	1.229*** (0.012)	1.151*** (0.013)	1.129*** (0.013)	1.138*** (0.017)	0.985*** (0.020)
Senate	-1.227*** (0.019)	-1.424*** (0.020)	-1.422*** (0.020)	-1.066*** (0.025)	-2.129*** (0.036)
Ad Cost (log)	-0.023*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.008)
Population (log)	0.050*** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.009)	0.046*** (0.012)
Year FE: 2012	-0.388*** (0.019)	-0.658*** (0.019)	-0.677*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.027)	-1.632*** (0.031)
Year FE: 2016	2.219*** (0.014)	2.189*** (0.014)	2.165*** (0.014)	2.767*** (0.021)	1.384*** (0.021)
Constant	-5.709*** (0.123)	-5.306*** (0.125)	-5.571*** (0.126)	-4.880*** (0.157)	-6.710*** (0.219)
Observations	1,277,252	1,277,252	1,277,252	687,549	589,703

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table Caption: This table displays several binary logistic regressions estimating, at the

level of an individual ad airing, whether that ad contains symbolic Latino identity content. Latino identity content is defined as having a Latino character/candidate or an explicit reference to Latino identity. Note that immigration ads are removed from these analyses, so only non-policy symbolic ads are shown in this table. The outcome is whether the ad contains the content (0) or not (1). Predictor variables are taken from the media market and year of the given ad airing. Model 1 estimates the effect of the percentage of a given media market's voting-eligible population that is Latino/Hispanic on the outcome. Model 2 adds a similar variable but for the White percentage of the voting-eligible population. Model 3 adds a dummy variable for whether the ad was Spanish-language (1) or not (0). Model 4 adds a competitiveness variable, where higher values correspond to closer elections and lower values to less close elections. Model 4 is then replicated but only for Democratic ads, and only for Republican ads. Each model also includes control variables for the office of the ad's sponsor/beneficiary (President or Senate, House as omitted category), for the cost of the ad (in U.S. dollars and base-10 log), for the population of the media market (base-10 log), and fixed effects for each year (2012 and 2016, with 2008 as the omitted category).

Next, in Table 2, we perform the same analyses but instead use inclusionary immigration rhetoric as our outcome of interest. We observe significantly more variation in the Latino VEP coefficient across models, with Democrats especially appearing to target inclusionary content towards areas with more Latino voters whereas Republicans do not shift behaviors either way (although it is important to note that Republican usage of inclusionary rhetoric is much lower compared to Democrats; see Figure 5). Across models, the White VEP variable is a significant negative predictor, indicating that campaigns avoid inclusionary immigration messages in areas with more White voters. Similarly, the Spanish-language coefficient is consistently and significantly positive, indicating efforts at targeting Latino voters while avoiding White viewership. Lastly, competitiveness is a significantly negative predictor for the full model and the Democrat/Republican-only models, which indicates that inclusionary immigration content is used less frequently in areas with more competitive elections. Most control variables remain consistent, except for the year fixed effects—these confirm that Democratic ads in 2012 and especially 2016 were more likely to include inclusionary content, as shown in Figure 5. These findings show that while Democrats are targeting Latino voters with inclusionary content, they attempt to avoid showing such messages to White voters. Furthermore, such inclusionary content is even less likely to be used in areas with close elections.

Table 2: Predictors of Inclusionary Content in Ads

	<i>Dependent variable: Whether ad has content (1) or not (0)</i>				
	Inclusionary/Pro-Immigrant Content				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(Dems Only)	(Reps Only)
Latino % of VEP	3.793*** (0.137)	0.382** (0.181)	1.050*** (0.178)	1.486*** (0.239)	-0.023 (0.283)
White % of VEP	-2.473*** (0.131)	-0.567*** (0.154)	-0.938*** (0.153)	-0.875*** (0.205)	-1.321*** (0.233)
Spanish Ad		4.950*** (0.032)	4.939*** (0.031)	4.898*** (0.038)	4.994*** (0.058)
Competitiveness			-1.183*** (0.042)	-1.005*** (0.052)	-1.530*** (0.079)
President	0.869*** (0.026)	0.291*** (0.031)	0.342*** (0.031)	0.157*** (0.040)	0.562*** (0.054)
Senate	0.001 (0.030)	-0.459*** (0.036)	-0.484*** (0.036)	-0.636*** (0.047)	-0.230*** (0.056)
Ad Cost	-0.130*** (0.009)	0.0004 (0.011)	0.024** (0.011)	0.002 (0.013)	0.102*** (0.018)
Population (log)	0.419*** (0.015)	0.074*** (0.017)	0.036** (0.017)	0.105*** (0.022)	-0.114*** (0.028)
Year FE: 2012	0.759*** (0.036)	-0.062 (0.039)	0.036 (0.040)	1.891*** (0.083)	-1.567*** (0.062)
Year FE: 2016	1.962*** (0.033)	1.504*** (0.036)	1.649*** (0.037)	3.304*** (0.082)	0.456*** (0.050)
Constant	-10.375*** (0.268)	-7.116*** (0.302)	-6.113*** (0.305)	-8.507*** (0.412)	-3.201*** (0.465)
Observations	1,277,252	1,277,252	1,277,252	687,549	589,703

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table Caption: This table displays several binary logistic regressions estimating, at the

level of an individual ad airing, whether that ad contains inclusionary immigration content (i.e., rhetoric supporting immigrants, supporting permissive immigration policies, or opposing restrictive immigration policies). The outcome is whether the ad contains the content (0) or not (1). Predictor variables are taken from the media market and year of the given ad airing. Model 1 estimates the effect of the percentage of a given media market's voting-eligible population that is Latino/Hispanic on the outcome. Model 2 adds a similar variable but for the White percentage of the voting-eligible population. Model 3 adds a dummy variable for whether the ad was Spanish-language (1) or not (0). Model 4 adds a competitiveness variable, where higher values correspond to closer elections and lower values to less close elections. Model 4 is then replicated but only for Democratic ads, and only for Republican ads. Each model also includes control variables for the office of the ad's sponsor/beneficiary (President or Senate, House as omitted category), for the cost of the ad (in U.S. dollars and base-10 log), for the population of the media market (base-10 log), and fixed effects for each year (2012 and 2016, with 2008 as the omitted category).

Lastly, in Table 3, we display estimates predicting the probability that a given ad includes exclusionary immigration content. Note that there were no instances in our data of exclusionary immigration content in a Spanish-language ad, so that variable is not included in these models. Similarly, as shown in Figure 5, only a small volume of Democratic ads contain exclusionary immigration content, primarily in 2008, so the Democratic-only model should be interpreted with more caution. Across models, Latino VEP is a significant negative predictor of an ad having exclusionary immigration content. The same is actually also true for White VEP, which goes against our theoretical expectations.¹¹ Ads are significantly more likely to have exclusionary content in more competitive contexts as well. Control variables suggest that exclusionary content is more common in congressional rather than presidential ads, and that Republicans in 2016 were especially likely to emphasize such rhetoric (as also shown in Figure 5). The overall takeaway of this table is that deployments of exclusionary immigration content in ads—which, again, are coming primarily from Republicans—are kept away from areas with more Latino voters, but not necessarily in a way that reflects a strategy of appealing to White voters. Instead of demographics having the expected single-direction effect, it is possible that such appeals are more likely in areas with more racial diversity or with larger non-White and non-Latino (i.e., Black, Asian, and other groups) populations. Furthermore, such appeals are also significantly more likely in more competitive electoral contexts.

¹¹One possibility is that such ads are more common in the most racially diverse settings, which would mean such content is highest when both Latino VEP and White VEP are closer to their averages. The other possibility is that such ads are targeted towards other racial groups, as our Latino and White VEP variables implicitly use Black, Asian, Native American and Other as the omitted categories.

Table 3: Predictors of Exclusionary Content in Ads

	<i>Dependent variable: Whether ad has content (1) or not (0)</i>			
	Exclusionary/Anti-Immigrant Content			
	(1)	(2)	(Dems Only)	(Reps Only)
Latino % of VEP	-1.914*** (0.103)	-2.125*** (0.106)	-1.655*** (0.169)	-1.460*** (0.128)
White % of VEP	-1.720*** (0.068)	-1.619*** (0.069)	-3.860*** (0.132)	-0.499*** (0.083)
Competitiveness		0.424*** (0.028)	0.175*** (0.065)	0.419*** (0.031)
President	-1.626*** (0.025)	-1.655*** (0.025)	-3.116*** (0.090)	-1.078*** (0.027)
Senate	-0.041*** (0.016)	-0.035** (0.016)	-0.513*** (0.036)	0.077*** (0.018)
Ad Cost (log)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.018 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.007)
Population (log)	-0.172*** (0.009)	-0.140*** (0.009)	-0.369*** (0.021)	-0.010 (0.010)
Year FE: 2012	-1.209*** (0.027)	-1.218*** (0.027)	-3.273*** (0.110)	-0.869*** (0.029)
Year FE: 2016	0.805*** (0.016)	0.787*** (0.016)	-1.425*** (0.052)	1.236*** (0.020)
Constant	-0.061 (0.133)	-0.744*** (0.141)	4.315*** (0.305)	-3.247*** (0.165)
Observations	1,277,252	1,277,252	687,549	589,703

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table Caption: This table displays several binary logistic regressions estimating, at the level of an individual ad airing, whether that ad contains exclusionary immigration content (i.e., rhetoric demeaning immigrants, supporting restrictive immigration policies, or

opposing permissive immigration policies). The outcome is whether the ad contains the content (0) or not (1). Predictor variables are taken from the media market and year of the given ad airing. Model 1 estimates the effect of the percentage of a given media market's voting-eligible population that is Latino/Hispanic on the outcome. Model 2 adds a similar variable but for the White percentage of the voting-eligible population. Model 3 adds a dummy variable for whether the ad was Spanish-language (1) or not (0). Model 4 adds a competitiveness variable, where higher values correspond to closer elections and lower values to less close elections. Model 4 is then replicated but only for Democratic ads, and only for Republican ads. Each model also includes control variables for the office of the ad's sponsor/beneficiary (President or Senate, House as omitted category), for the cost of the ad (in U.S. dollars and base-10 log), for the population of the media market (base-10 log), and fixed effects for each year (2012 and 2016, with 2008 as the omitted category).

We conclude our results by discussing how our regression findings relate to our hypotheses. In our first hypothesis, we predicted that both parties would use more symbolic identity content when they could expect audiences to have more Latino voters. In Table 1, we found strong evidence of this: across several models and for both parties, the Latino percentage of a media market's voting-eligible population is significantly positively associated with an ad including symbolic Latino identity content. The same is true for Spanish-language ads compared to English-language ads. Next, in our second hypotheses, we predicted that ads from Democrats would tend to emphasize inclusionary immigration content towards audiences with more Latino voters while avoiding such content when seeking to reach White voters. We find fairly strong evidence supporting this claim in Table 2, where we observe that inclusionary content is significantly more likely to be used by Democrats in areas with more Latino voters and in Spanish-language ads, and significantly less likely in areas with more White voters. Finally, in our third hypothesis, we predicted that ads from Republicans would tend to emphasize exclusionary immigration content towards White audiences and avoid such topics when Latino viewership is more likely. Our

test of this claim in Table 3 provides some support for the Latino viewership portion, as the percentage of Latinos in the voting-eligible population is significantly negatively associated with exclusionary content from either party. However, we do not support our claim that such ads are targeted more towards White voters. In summary, we strongly support our symbolic identity (H1) and inclusionary rhetoric (H2) hypotheses but only find evidence of the Latino viewership portion of our exclusionary rhetoric hypotheses (H3), with no clear evidence that such rhetoric follows White population trends in the same way.

8 Discussion

While there remain ongoing debates about the true efficacy of televised campaign advertisements (Gerber et al. 2011; Kalla and Broockman 2018; Velez and Newman 2019), our initial results clearly show that campaigns have maintained their high levels of spending on such efforts during the 2000-2016 time period. We also find that both parties greatly increased their deployment of symbolic identity cues and immigration rhetoric overall, although these patterns diverged in important ways for each topic. Each party exhibited similar behaviors with regards to symbolic Latino identity content, demonstrating the overall growth in the electoral importance of the Latino voter population (Barreto and Segura 2014; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019; Garza and Yang 2020). However, on immigration, while Democrats steadily began emphasizing inclusionary immigration rhetoric and targeted such messages towards Latinos, Republicans conversely became more likely to use exclusionary immigration rhetoric more or less anywhere. These trends intensified especially in 2016, which our descriptive results show was truly a different level in terms of Latino identity content and immigration rhetoric.

Overall, we find that campaigns from both parties are engaging more Latino voters using immigration appeals and Latino identity cues than previous research has suggested (Abrajano 2010; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Nteta and Schaffner 2013). This provides some

promise in terms of indicating that Latino voters are being sought after by both Democratic and Republican campaigns. However, there is a disconnect between each party's strategies regarding symbolic identity content, which demonstrates a largely positive effort at including Latinos and Latino identity appeals in ads, and immigration, which is a much more mixed bag. Democrats are using inclusionary messages towards Latinos (alongside symbolic identity content) but also try to hide such ads from Whites, which could potentially result in perceptions that they are pandering towards Latinos rather than genuinely addressing an important policy area (Mansbridge 1999; Dovi 2002; Flores and Coppock 2018; Zárata 2023; Álvaro J Corral and David L Leal 2024). Republicans, meanwhile, are trying to have their cake and eat it too by simultaneously engaging in positive portrayals of Latinos alongside exclusionary immigration rhetoric. However, as some recent research has suggested, there may not be as much of a disconnect given that some Latinos identify as Republican and support exclusionary immigration stances, especially towards undocumented immigrants (Alamillo 2019; Hickel, Alamillo, et al. 2020; Hickel, Oskooii, and Collingwood 2024). While beyond the scope of this paper, the greater emphasis on Latino outreach among Republicans that we observe could potentially explain higher-than-expected Latino voter support for Republicans in recent elections (Álvaro J. Corral and David L. Leal 2020; Angela X. Ocampo, Garcia-Rios, and Gutierrez 2021; Dyck and G. B. Johnson 2022; Hopkins, Kaiser, and Pérez 2023; Fraga, Velez, and West 2024).

9 Conclusion

Still, these opportunities for campaigns could come at a cost for Latino voters. The ability for Democrats to specifically cater their ads to Latinos means that they can emphasize Latino identity content and inclusionary immigration stances for ads that are likely to have Latino viewers while eschewing such topics in other contexts. This means that while many Latinos may believe that Democrats are supportive of immigrant rights, such

issues are not being emphasized towards other voters and are not as important on the policy agenda (Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez 2018; Zárate 2023). When such messaging about immigration and immigration threat are continually not met with actual policy changes, Latino voters may become disaffected with Democrats and more politically disengaged overall (Cruz Nichols 2017). On the other side of the aisle, the exclusionary immigration rhetoric used by Republicans—which we find has massively increased in 2016—can have hugely negative effects on the mental health and political engagement of Latino populations and can spark anti-Latino attitudes and violence (Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Pérez 2015b; Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2019; Canizales and Vallejo 2021; Angela X Ocampo 2024). Just because they are also engaging in positive portrayals of Latinos and have prominent Latino candidates does not diminish the potential harm of these messages. For both parties, the implications of our results is that while they have many more technologies and strategies at their disposal, they have oftentimes used such resources in ways that facilitate pandering, xenophobia, and racialization.

Ultimately, these findings are also concerning in terms of broader discussions of democratic accountability and the role of advertising. Our findings show that each party has at least two completely different sets of messages that they use in different contexts and towards different groups of voters. Incomplete—or even worse, inaccurate or outright irrelevant—political information from campaigns decreases rates of political learning and engagement and can cause alienation, especially among low-propensity voters like Latinos (Abrajano 2010; Hajnal and Lee 2011; García Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Fraga 2018; Zárate 2023). This is exacerbated by the continual failure to enact immigration reform despite the rising volume of campaign messaging on the topic (Cruz Nichols 2017). If campaigns continue to increase their usage of both symbolic Latino identity content and partisan-polarized stances on immigration, as we find in our results, it will remain to be seen if such strategies have the expected effect on Latino voters.

References

- Abrajano, Marisa (2010). *Campaigning to the New American Electorate: Advertising to Latino Voters*. Redwood City, UNITED STATES: Stanford University Press.
- Abrajano, Marisa and Zoltan L. Hajnal (2015). *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics*. Princeton University Press. 255 pp.
- Alamillo, Rudy (2019). “Hispanic Para Trump?: Denial of Racism and Hispanic Support for Trump”. In: *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 16.2, pp. 457–487. DOI: [10.1017/S1742058X19000328](https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X19000328).
- Anguiano, Claudia A. (2016). “Hostility and Hispandering in 2016: The Demographic and Discursive Power of Latinx Voters”. In: *Women’s Studies in Communication* 39.4, pp. 366–369. DOI: [10.1080/07491409.2016.1228385](https://doi.org/10.1080/07491409.2016.1228385).
- Barreto, Matt A. (2010). *Ethnic Cues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation*. University of Michigan Press. 240 pp.
- Barreto, Matt A. and Loren Collingwood (2015). “Group-based appeals and the Latino vote in 2012: How immigration became a mobilizing issue”. In: *Electoral Studies* 40, pp. 490–499. DOI: [10.1016/j.electstud.2014.09.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.09.008).
- Barreto, Matt A., Sylvia Manzano, et al. (2009). “Mobilization, Participation, and Solidaridad: Latino Participation in the 2006 Immigration Protest Rallies”. In: *Urban Affairs Review* 44.5, pp. 736–764. DOI: [10.1177/1078087409332925](https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087409332925).
- Barreto, Matt A., Jennifer Merolla, and Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto (2011). “Multiple Dimensions of Mobilization: The Effect of Direct Contact and Political Ads on Latino Turnout in the 2000 Presidential Election”. In: *Journal of Political Marketing* 10.4, pp. 303–327. DOI: [10.1080/15377857.2011.614548](https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2011.614548).
- Barreto, Matt A., Tyler Reny, and Bryan Wilcox-Archuleta (2017). *Survey Methodology and the Latina/o Vote: Why a Bilingual, Bicultural, Latino-Centered Approach Matters*.

- Barreto, Matt A. and Gary M. Segura (2014). *Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation*. New York, UNITED STATES: PublicAffairs.
- Bobo, Lawrence and Franklin D. Gilliam (1990). "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment". In: *The American Political Science Review* 84.2, pp. 377–393. DOI: [10.2307/1963525](https://doi.org/10.2307/1963525).
- Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay (2008). "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat". In: *American Journal of Political Science* 52.4, pp. 959–978. DOI: [10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00353.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00353.x).
- Cadava, Geraldo L. (2020). *The Hispanic Republican: The Shaping of an American Political Identity, from Nixon to Trump*. Illustrated edition. Ecco. 447 pp.
- Calderón, José (1992). "'Hispanic' and 'Latino': The Viability of Categories for Panethnic Unity". In: *Latin American Perspectives* 19.4, pp. 37–44. DOI: [10.1177/0094582X9201900404](https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X9201900404).
- Canizales, Stephanie L. and Jody Agius Vallejo (2021). "Latinos & Racism in the Trump Era". In: *Daedalus* 150.2, pp. 150–164. DOI: [10.1162/daed_a_01852](https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01852).
- Collingwood, Loren and Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien (2019). *Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge*. Oxford University Press. 221 pp.
- Corral, Álvaro J and David L Leal (2024). "El Cuento del Destino: Latino Voters, Demographic Determinism, and the Myth of an Inevitable Democratic Party Majority". In: *Political Science Quarterly*, qqae005. DOI: [10.1093/psquar/qqae005](https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae005).
- (2020). "Latinos por Trump? Latinos and the 2016 Presidential Election". In: *Social Science Quarterly* 101.3, pp. 1115–1131. DOI: [10.1111/ssqu.12787](https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12787).
- Craig, Maureen A. and Jennifer A. Richeson (2018). "Hispanic Population Growth Engenders Conservative Shift Among Non-Hispanic Racial Minorities". In: *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 9.4, pp. 383–392. DOI: [10.1177/1948550617712029](https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617712029).

- Cruz Nichols, Vanessa (2017). “Latinos Rising to the Challenge: Political Responses to Threat and Opportunity Messages”. In.
- Dovi, Suzanne (2002). “Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do?” In: *American Political Science Review* 96.4, pp. 729–743. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055402000412](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402000412).
- Dyck, Joshua J. and Gregg B. Johnson (2022). “Constructing a New Measure of Macropartisanship Disaggregated by Race and Ethnicity”. In: *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 7.3, pp. 433–459. DOI: [10.1017/rep.2021.35](https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2021.35).
- Farris, Emily M. and Heather Silber Mohamed (2018). “Picturing immigration: how the media criminalizes immigrants”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 6.4, pp. 814–824. DOI: [10.1080/21565503.2018.1484375](https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1484375).
- Flores, Alejandro and Alexander Coppock (2018). “Do Bilinguals Respond More Favorably to Candidate Advertisements in English or in Spanish?” In: *Political Communication* 35.4, pp. 612–633. DOI: [10.1080/10584609.2018.1426663](https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1426663).
- Fowler, Erika Franklin, Michael M. Franz, et al. (2021). “Political Advertising Online and Offline”. In: *American Political Science Review* 115.1, pp. 130–149. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055420000696](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000696).
- Fowler, Erika Franklin, Travis N. Ridout, and Michael M. Franz (2016). “Political Advertising in 2016: The Presidential Election as Outlier?” In: *The Forum* 14.4, pp. 445–469. DOI: [10.1515/for-2016-0040](https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2016-0040).
- Fraga, Bernard L. (2018). *The turnout gap: race, ethnicity, and political inequality in a diversifying America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1 online resource (xiv, 274 pages).
- Fraga, Bernard L., Yamil Ricardo Velez, and Emily A. West (2024). “Reversion to the Mean, or their Version of the Dream? An Analysis of Latino Voting in 2020”. In: *American Political Science Review*.

- Francis-Fallon, Benjamin (2019). *The Rise of the Latino Vote*. United States: Harvard University Press.
- Franz, Michael M. (2018). “Targeting Campaign Messages : Good for Campaigns but Bad for America?” In: *New Directions in Media and Politics*. Ed. by Travis N. Ridout. Routledge, pp. 174–198. DOI: [10.4324/9780203713020-10](https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203713020-10).
- Frymer, Paul and John David Skrentny (1998). “Coalition-Building and the Politics of Electoral Capture During the Nixon Administration: African Americans, Labor, Latinos”. In: *Studies in American Political Development* 12.1, pp. 131–161. DOI: [10.1017/S0898588X9800131X](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X9800131X).
- Gainous, Jason and Kevin M. Wagner (2013). *Tweeting to Power: The Social Media Revolution in American Politics*. Oxford University Press. 206 pp.
- Garcia, John A. (2016). *Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture, and Interests*. Rowman & Littlefield. 333 pp.
- García Bedolla, Lisa (2005). *Fluid Borders: Latino Power, Identity, and Politics in Los Angeles*. University of California Press. 294 pp.
- García Bedolla, Lisa and Melissa Michelson (2012). *Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate Through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns*. New Haven, UNITED STATES: Yale University Press.
- Garcia-Rios, Sergio, Francisco Pedraza, and Bryan Wilcox-Archuleta (2019). “Direct and Indirect Xenophobic Attacks: Unpacking Portfolios of Identity”. In: *Political Behavior* 41.3, pp. 633–656. DOI: [10.1007/s11109-018-9465-5](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9465-5).
- Garza, Rodolfo O. de la and Alan S. Yang (2020). *Americanizing Latino politics, latinoizing American politics*. Red. by Routledge (Firm) and Taylor & Francis. New York, NY: Routledge. xxvii, 242 pages.
- Gerber, Alan S. et al. (2011). “How Large and Long-lasting Are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment”. In: *The American Political Science Review* 105.1, pp. 135–150.

- Gervais, Bryan T. and Walter C. Wilson (2019). “New media for the new electorate? Congressional outreach to Latinos on Twitter”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 7.2, pp. 305–323. DOI: [10.1080/21565503.2017.1358186](https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2017.1358186).
- Gonzalez-Barrera, Jens Manuel Krogstad {and} Ana (2015). *A majority of English-speaking Hispanics in the U.S. are bilingual*. Pew Research Center.
- Gutierrez, Angela et al. (2019). “Somos Más: How Racial Threat and Anger Mobilized Latino Voters in the Trump Era”. In: *Political Research Quarterly* 72.4, pp. 960–975. DOI: [10.1177/1065912919844327](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919844327).
- Hajnal, Zoltan L. and Taeku Lee (2011). *Why Americans Don't Join the Party: Race, Immigration, and the Failure (of Political Parties) to Engage the Electorate*. Princeton University Press. 345 pp.
- Hersh, Eitan (2015). *Hacking the electorate : how campaigns perceive voters*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 1 online resource.
- Hersh, Eitan and Brian Schaffner (2013). “Targeted Campaign Appeals and the Value of Ambiguity”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 75.2, pp. 520–534. DOI: [10.1017/S0022381613000182](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000182).
- Hickel Jr., Flavio R., Rudy Alamillo, et al. (2020). “The Role of Identity Prioritization: Why Some Latinx Support Restrictionist Immigration Policies and Candidates”. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 84.4, pp. 860–891. DOI: [10.1093/poq/nfaa048](https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfaa048).
- Hickel Jr., Flavio R., Kassra A R Oskooij, and Loren Collingwood (2024). “Social Mobility through Immigrant Resentment: Explaining Latinx Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies and Anti-immigrant Candidates”. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 88.1, pp. 51–78. DOI: [10.1093/poq/nfad066](https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad066).
- Hillygus, D. Sunshine and Todd G. Shields (2008). *The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns*. Princeton University Press. 268 pp.
- Hopkins, Daniel (2010). “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition”. In: *American Political Science Review* 104.1, pp. 40–60. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055409990360](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990360).

- Hopkins, Daniel, Cheryl Kaiser, and Efrén O. Pérez (2023). “The Surprising Stability of Asian Americans’ and Latinos’ Partisan Identities in the Early Trump Era”. In: *The Journal of Politics*. DOI: [10.1086/724964](https://doi.org/10.1086/724964).
- HoSang, Daniel (2010). *Racial Propositions: Ballot Initiatives and the Making of Postwar California*. University of California Press. 609 pp.
- Jardina, Ashley (2019). *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press. 387 pp.
- Jardina, Ashley and Trent Ollerenshaw (2022). “The Polls—Trends: The Polarization of White Racial Attitudes and Support for Racial Equality in the US”. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 86 (S1), pp. 576–587. DOI: [10.1093/poq/nfac021](https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfac021).
- Jones-Correa, Michael, Hajer Al-Faham, and David Cortez (2018). “Political (Mis)behavior: Attention and Lacunae in the Study of Latino Politics”. In: *Annual Review of Sociology* 44.1, pp. 213–235. DOI: [10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112411](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112411).
- Kalla, Joshua L. and David E. Broockman (2018). “The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments”. In: *American Political Science Review* 112.1, pp. 148–166. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055417000363](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000363).
- Krogstad, Jens Manuel (2020). *Hispanics have accounted for more than half of total U.S. population growth since 2010*. Pew Research Center.
- Lee, Taeku (2008). “Race, Immigration, and the Identity-to-Politics Link”. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1, pp. 457–478. DOI: [10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.051707.122615](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.051707.122615).
- Mansbridge, Jane (1999). “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes””. In: *The Journal of Politics* 61.3, pp. 628–657. DOI: [10.2307/2647821](https://doi.org/10.2307/2647821).
- Masuoka, Natalie and Jane Junn (2013). *The Politics of Belonging*. University of Chicago Press.
- Mendelberg, Tali (2001). *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton University Press. 324 pp.

- Mora, G. Cristina (2014). *Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a New American*. University of Chicago Press. 250 pp.
- Mutz, Diana C. (2018). “Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote”. In: *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 115.19, E4330–E4339. DOI: [10.1073/pnas.1718155115](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718155115).
- Newman, Benjamin J., Sono Shah, and Loren Collingwood (2018). “Race, place, and building a base: Latino population growth and the nascent Trump campaign for president”. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82.1, pp. 122–134. DOI: [10.1093/poq/nfx039](https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx039).
- Novak, Alison N, Kristine C Johnson, and Manuel Pontes (2016). “LatinoTwitter: Discourses of Latino civic engagement in social media”. In: *First Monday* 21(8), p. 12.
- Nteta, Tatishe M. and Brian Schaffner (2013). “Substance and Symbolism: Race, Ethnicity, and Campaign Appeals in the United States”. In: *Political Communication* 30.2, pp. 232–253. DOI: [10.1080/10584609.2012.737425](https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2012.737425).
- Oboler, Suzanne (1995). *Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of (re)presentation in the United States*. University of Minnesota Press. 260 pp.
- Ocampo, Angela X (2024). “Truly at home? Perceived belonging and immigrant incorporation”. In: *Social Forces*, soae094. DOI: [10.1093/sf/soae094](https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae094).
- Ocampo, Angela X., Sergio Garcia-Rios, and Angela Gutierrez (2021). “Háblame de tí: Latino mobilization, group dynamics and issue prioritization in the 2020 Election”. In: *The Forum*. DOI: [10.1515/for-2020-2110](https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2020-2110).
- Ostfeld, Mara Cecilia (2019). “The New White Flight?: The Effects of Political Appeals to Latinos on White Democrats”. In: *Political Behavior* 41.3, pp. 561–582. DOI: [10.1007/s11109-018-9462-8](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9462-8).
- Padilla, Felix M. (1985). *Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago*. University of Notre Dame Press. 212 pp.
- Panagopoulos, Costas (2016). “All about that base”. In: *Party Politics* 22.2, pp. 179–190. DOI: [10.1177/1354068815605676](https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815605676).

- Pantoja, Adrian D. and Gary M. Segura (2003). “Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation Among Latinos”. In: *Social Science Quarterly* 84.2, pp. 441–460.
- Pérez, Efrén O. (2015a). “Ricochet: How Elite Discourse Politicizes Racial and Ethnic Identities”. In: *Political Behavior* 37.1, pp. 155–180. DOI: [10.1007/s11109-013-9262-0](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9262-0).
- (2015b). “Xenophobic Rhetoric and Its Political Effects on Immigrants and Their Co-Ethnics”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 59.3, pp. 549–564. DOI: [10.1111/ajps.12131](https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12131).
- Prior, Markus (2007). *Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections*. Cambridge University Press. 289 pp.
- Reny, Tyler, Ali A. Valenzuela, and Loren Collingwood (2019). ““No, You’re Playing the Race Card”: Testing the Effects of Anti-Black, Anti-Latino, and Anti-Immigrant Appeals in the Post-Obama Era”. In: *Political Psychology* 0.0. DOI: [10.1111/pops.12614](https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12614).
- Rocha, Chuck (2020). *Tío Bernie: The Inside Story of How Bernie Sanders Brought Latinos Into the Political Revolution*.
- Sadhwani, Sara and Matthew Mendez (2018). “Candidate Ethnicity and Latino Voting in Co-Partisan Elections”. In: *California Journal of Politics and Policy* 10.2. DOI: [10.5070/P2cjpp10241253](https://doi.org/10.5070/P2cjpp10241253).
- Sanchez, Gabriel R. (2021). *Immigration and the Latino vote: A golden opportunity for Democrats in 2022*. Brookings.
- Sanchez, Gabriel R. and Natalie Masuoka (2010). “Brown Utility Heuristic? The Presence and Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate”. In: 32.4, pp. 519–531.
- Sanchez, Gabriel R. and Jason L. Morin (2011). “The Effect of Descriptive Representation on Latinos’ Views of Government and of Themselves”. In: *Social Science Quarterly* 92.2, pp. 483–508.
- Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck (2019). *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton University Press. 360 pp.

- Subervi-Velez, Federico (2009). *The Mass Media and Latino Politics: Studies of U.S. Media Content, Campaign Strategies and Survey Research: 1984-2004*. Routledge. 442 pp.
- Tajfel, Henri (1982). *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tesler, Michael (2016). *Post-Racial or Most-Racial?: Race and Politics in the Obama Era*. University of Chicago Press. 276 pp.
- Tran, Van C (2010). “English gain vs. Spanish loss? Language assimilation among second-generation Latinos in young adulthood”. In: *Social Forces* 89.1, pp. 257–284.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Ted Brader, and Ashley Jardina (2013). “Immigration Opposition Among U.S. Whites: General Ethnocentrism or Media Priming of Attitudes About Latinos?” In: *Political Psychology* 34.2, pp. 149–166. DOI: [10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00928.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00928.x).
- Valenzuela, Ali A. (2022). *Competing for Identity: How Close Elections Unify and Politicize Latinos in America*.
- Valenzuela, Ali A. and Tyler Reny (2021). “The Evolution of Experiments on Racial Priming”. In: *Advances in Experimental Political Science*. Ed. by Donald P. Green and James N. Druckman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 447–467. DOI: [10.1017/9781108777919.031](https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108777919.031).
- Velez, Yamil Ricardo and Benjamin J. Newman (2019). “Tuning In, Not Turning Out: Evaluating the Impact of Ethnic Television on Political Participation”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 63.4, pp. 808–823. DOI: [10.1111/ajps.12427](https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12427).
- White, Ariel (2016). “When Threat Mobilizes: Immigration Enforcement and Latino Voter Turnout”. In: *Political Behavior* 38.2, pp. 355–382. DOI: [10.1007/s11109-015-9317-5](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-015-9317-5).
- Wilcox-Archuleta, Bryan (2018). “Local Origins: Context, Group Identity, and Politics of Place”. In: *Political Research Quarterly* 71.4, pp. 960–974. DOI: [10.1177/1065912918772933](https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918772933).

- Wilkinson, Kenton T. (2015). *Spanish-Language Television in the United States: Fifty Years of Development*. New York: Routledge. 328 pp. DOI: [10.4324/9781315775821](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315775821).
- Wroe, A. (2008). *The Republican Party and Immigration Politics: From Proposition 187 to George W. Bush*. Springer. 298 pp.
- Zárate, Marques G. (2023). “Dimensions of Pandering Perceptions Among Hispanic Americans and Their Effect on Political Trust”. In: *Political Communication* 0.0, pp. 1–24. DOI: [10.1080/10584609.2023.2196972](https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2023.2196972).
- Zárate, Marques G., Enrique Quezada-Llanes, and Angel D. Armenta (2024). “Se Habla Español: Spanish-Language Appeals and Candidate Evaluations in the United States”. In: *American Political Science Review* 118.1, pp. 363–379. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055423000084](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000084).
- Zepeda-Millán, Chris (2017). *Latino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization, and Activism*. Cambridge University Press. 309 pp.
- Zepeda-Millán, Chris and Sophia J. Wallace (2013). “Racialization in times of contention: how social movements influence Latino racial identity”. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 1.4, pp. 510–527. DOI: [10.1080/21565503.2013.842492](https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2013.842492).